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SIR JOHN ORDE AND THE TRAFALGAR
CAMPAIGN
A Failure of Information Sharing
J. Ross Dancy and Evan Wilson

W

hat we now call the Trafalgar campaign took place over the spring
and summer of 1805. French, Spanish, and British fleets raced back
and forth across the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Orders flew from London
and Madrid, and especially from Boulogne, where Napoléon was camped with
165,000 men preparing to invade Britain. Confusion was the order of the day.
French admirals often executed one set of orders, only to learn later that other admirals were executing an entirely different set. The
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admiral Sir John Orde. It is not an obvious point of inquiry, as there is a wellestablished historical consensus about Orde’s actions, which can be summarized
as follows. Orde commanded a detached squadron of five ships of the line tasked
with blockading a similarly sized force of Spanish ships in Cádiz. On 9 April 1805,
Orde was surprised to see a fleet of eleven French ships of the line sail through
the Strait of Gibraltar. The Toulon Fleet, commanded by Admiral Pierre-Charles
de Villeneuve, had managed to escape Nelson’s watching frigates. As the French
approached Cádiz, Orde was faced with odds of three to one and caught between
the two enemy forces. He sensibly withdrew. Assessing the strategic situation,
Orde knew that for Napoléon to launch an invasion flotilla, the French needed
to gain control of the English Channel. To do that required the defeat of Britain’s
largest fleet, which was positioned to guard against that very possibility, in the
western approaches to the Channel. Whatever Napoléon’s plans were for the
French and Spanish ships in Cádiz, the appropriate course of action was for Orde
to concentrate British forces on the strategic point. He did so, arriving in the
Channel a month later.
By withdrawing to the Channel, Orde had correctly ascertained Napoléon’s
plans, which indeed did call for a concentration of naval forces in the western
approaches. No less a luminary than Sir Julian Corbett claimed that Orde was
the first Englishman to understand the pattern of what was to follow. Corbett
credited Orde with “penetrating appreciation,” arguing that with the ships under
his command he “did everything that the means available permitted.”1 Modern
historians have followed Corbett’s lead. While the incident off Cádiz usually merits just a few lines in the standard narrative, the most recent authoritative works
have not seen fit to question Corbett’s account. They roundly praise Orde for his
sound judgment and strategic insight.2
Interestingly, Orde’s contemporaries were less impressed with his actions.
Corbett’s assessment (from 1910) cut against the previously established opinion
of Orde and reversed more than a century of criticism and vitriol. The opening
salvos were fired as soon as news of Orde’s actions reached London. Fellow naval
officers were eager to second-guess his decisions. One officer bemoaned that
Orde had been timid in the face of the enemy, implying that Orde should have
stayed and fought Villeneuve.3 Others thought he should have sought to join the
squadron under Sir Robert Calder off Ferrol, and still more argued that he should
have shadowed Villeneuve to the West Indies.4 Orde was a notoriously unpopular
officer, as this article will explore, but his personal qualities do not explain the
ferocity of the attacks launched against him in the aftermath of the campaign.
One letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty said that Orde should be fired, “and
I hope broke, if not shot, for his disgraceful and cowardly conduct.”5 The echoes

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/10

2

DA N C Y & W I L S O N

Dancy and Wilson: Sir John Orde and the Trafalgar Campaign—A Failure of Information

143

of Admiral John Byng’s execution for cowardice in 1757 are unmistakable. Orde
and his contemporaries were operating in an environment in which British officers were expected to lead their forces into heroic battle no matter the odds and
no matter the strategic situation.6
The nineteenth-century criticism of Orde goes too far, and there is no need
to revive it. We should not judge Orde as Byng was judged. However, Corbett’s
influential argument is overdue for a critical reading. Corbett’s main thrust—that
Orde was correct to bring his ships back to the Channel—holds up well. Given
the balance of numbers and the state of Orde’s fleet, attempting to fight likely
would have been catastrophic. Orde also demonstrated laudable insight into
Napoléon’s ultimate purpose. Yet he did not do “everything that the means available permitted.” At the moment the French fleet appeared off Cádiz, Orde possessed more information than any other British flag officer. His knowledge of the
whereabouts and strength of the Combined Fleet placed immense responsibility
on him to share that information as widely and quickly as possible. He failed in
this mission, which cost Nelson a good chance of bringing the campaign to a halt
six months before Trafalgar.
The preceding is a summary of the initial goal of this article: to speak to naval
historians and, by delving deeply into the archival record, revise the standard
account of the Trafalgar campaign. But there is more to say. Ironically, the closer
we examine a historical event, the more uncertainty we uncover. At some point,
we reach the end of the available empirical evidence and enter a realm where
individual thought processes are impossible to reconstruct. A fundamental challenge of empirical historical research is to put ourselves in someone else’s head: to
empathize, while remaining detached; to use judiciously our knowledge of how
the story ends; and to describe the known unknowns and retreat in the face of
the unknown unknowns.
It is easy to become uncomfortable with these processes, and historians often
are quick to step back from considering individual motivations and impose structures that seek to make sense of the human experience. This article attempts to do
both: it asks what role human nature plays in the conduct of naval operations, and
how we can connect the answer to that question to broader questions of strategy.
Taking a microscope to one man’s role in a historical event uncovers the tension
between organizations and their personnel—their fallible, jealous, self-interested,
human personnel. Strategists behind the scenes must plan; commanders on the
spot must act. A detailed, intensive examination of one commander’s actions
raises broader questions of strategy and command structure. Under scrutiny, we
find the uncertainties of human emotions and motivations. Stepping back, we
see how the organization in which the man operated set him up for failure. Naval
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officers are intimately familiar with the human element in naval operations, as
they grapple with it daily. What follows provides a case study of strategic and
operational failure in one of the most well-known campaigns in naval history.
Readers will be unsurprised to learn that Orde’s failure was not solely his own.
The Admiralty set him up for failure by breaking with precedent, ignoring obvious sources of political and personal conflict, and creating problematic command
boundaries. In today’s parlance, the Admiralty created a problem along the seams
of areas of responsibility, leading to a failure of information sharing. Revisiting
the messy details of the confusing Trafalgar campaign provides an opportunity
to reassess the role that Orde played in it, and to call more attention to the role of
Admiralty mismanagement in prolonging it. Orde’s failure to inform Nelson of
the French fleet’s disposition is an example of a failure to achieve mission command. Demarcating command responsibilities requires senior commanders to
communicate their intent; junior commanders to understand that intent; and
everyone, throughout the system, to trust in commanders on the spot. The challenge is to choose the appropriate personnel and provide them with structures
and instructions that help them succeed in rapidly changing tactical situations.7
SETTING THE STAGE
John Orde was born in 1751 to a family of landed gentry in Northumberland. His
older brother Thomas was a politician who married the natural daughter of the
Duke of Bolton. As a result, throughout his career John could rely on extensive
connections with the great and the good. He joined the navy in 1766, was commissioned a lieutenant in 1773, and first experienced combat in the American
Revolutionary War. His big break came when Lord Howe appointed him first
lieutenant of his flagship in 1777. He then gave him command of a sloop, and in
May 1778 made him post captain into the frigate Virginia.8
The date of his promotion to post captain is significant. Post captain was the
highest rank to which an officer could be promoted on merit regardless of previous rank, seniority, or experience. From there, promotion proceeded by seniority
alone (although employment depended on a mixture of talent and connections).
The date of seniority for post captains influenced their seniority for the remainder of their careers. The sooner you were promoted to post captain, the sooner
you would be promoted to rear admiral, although most officers had to wait about
twenty years.9 Nelson, despite being seven years younger than Orde, was made
post in June 1779.10 That thirteen-month difference in seniority would prove
pivotal in later years.
When peace arrived in 1783, Orde was appointed governor of Dominica, an
island newly acquired by the British in the peace settlement. Here he first came
into contact with Nelson, who was stationed in Antigua during the peace. At
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/10
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Dominica, Orde worked to improve the harbor and solidify British rule, and
was successful enough to be rewarded with a baronetcy at the end of his tenure
in 1790. Yet there were hints of trouble: Orde had clashed with the colonial assembly in Dominica over funding for harbor improvements. Cuthbert Collingwood, who had served with both Nelson and Orde in the West Indies, thought
Orde’s actions were justified. He wrote to Orde, “Men of honour and strict integrity in a high publick station will ever be obnoxious to a certain description
of people. . . . I hope you will never return to them, and that the day will come
when they lament your absence.”11
Collingwood’s high opinion of Orde was not widely shared.12 Although Orde’s
career up to 1790 had been successful, the clash with the Dominican colonial assembly foreshadowed the problems that would plague him for the rest of his life.
An Audit Office investigation of Orde later found that Collingwood’s praise was
unwarranted: in fact, Orde had mismanaged public funds while governor, costing him £2,420 in penalty fees.13 Not only did Orde demonstrate repeatedly an
unsavory enthusiasm for profiting off his public service, but he also lacked tact
and judgment in dealing with fellow officers. The general consensus was that he
was arrogant and officious, and few captains who served under him enjoyed the
experience.14 One captain said that he was “a strange high and haughty man to
all his Captains, who are all but myself at paper war with him; he has given out
some curious regulations and signals; he works them from morning till night
with signals.”15
Orde was promoted to rear admiral in June 1795. Because of the thirteenmonth difference in seniority, Nelson was not high enough on the post captains
list to join him, and remained a post captain until February 1797. In 1798, their
paths crossed fatefully. Orde was serving as third in command of the Mediterranean Fleet under the Earl of St. Vincent. A large French expedition was known
to be preparing at Toulon for an unknown destination, and St. Vincent, stationed
at the time off Cádiz, detached a small force to monitor it. Orde was in prime
position to receive command of this detachment, which promised the possibility
of a glorious battle. Instead, Nelson, fresh off shore leave to recover from the loss
of his arm, swooped in and received the plum assignment. The appointment of
the junior Nelson over Orde rankled: he wrote to St. Vincent, “I cannot conceal
from your Lordship how much I feel hurt.”16
Orde’s pain was compounded by interpersonal clashes with Sir Roger Curtis,
who was both marginally senior to Orde and an officer who reasonably might
claim to have been at least as disliked in the service.17 Orde made no friends
in his squadron, either. When one of his captains missed or disobeyed his signals, he brought all the captains aboard his flagship and publicly reprimanded
them on the quarterdeck. The episode made news in Britain. One captain
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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requested a court-martial to clear his name—hardly an indication of effective man
management by his admiral.18 Not only was Orde struggling to get along with fellow officers, but the result of Nelson’s detachment was in fact a great fleet victory.
The Battle of the Nile in August 1798 saw Nelson become the most famous naval
officer of his generation, solidified his reputation as a daring tactician, and elevated him to the peerage as Baron Nelson of the Nile. Orde’s jealousy was palpable.
St. Vincent eventually became so fed up with Orde that he sent him home, calling him “a vain ignorant supercilious creature.”19 Orde appealed to the Admiralty,
requesting that St. Vincent be court-martialed. The Admiralty gently tapped St.
Vincent on the wrist instead, so Orde waited until St. Vincent, who was in poor
health after two years at sea, returned to England in June 1799. After granting
him four months to recover, Orde challenged him to a duel. While dueling had
long been essential to the maintenance of a gentleman’s honor, it was generally
in decline in this period, especially in wartime. Orde—stalking an ailing, sixtyfour-year-old man around Essex—looked ridiculous. Lord Spencer, the First
Lord of the Admiralty, was flabbergasted at Orde’s behavior and asked the king
to intervene. St. Vincent was forbidden from fighting, which came as a relief to
all, and Orde had to give a surety of £2,000 to keep the peace.20
Orde’s disgraceful performance should have ended his career. For the next five
years, it appeared to have done so. In 1801, St. Vincent became First Lord of the
Admiralty under the Addington administration. That same year, Nelson—who
nearly had ruined his career in Naples after the Nile—once again justified all the
support he had received from St. Vincent and other senior officers by performing
admirably at the Battle of Copenhagen. Orde languished ashore unemployed on
half pay, secure in the knowledge that St. Vincent would never consider appointing him to an active command.
Two events rescued Orde from discreditable obscurity. First, the brief peace
brought about with the 1802 Treaty of Amiens collapsed with the British declaration of war in May 1803. War naturally increased employment chances for officers, although with St. Vincent still at the Admiralty Orde had no prospects. In
the spring of 1804, rumors began to circulate that the Addington ministry was in
trouble. Orde saw his chance, writing to the secretary of the Admiralty in March
to request employment.21 The rumors were correct, and in May William Pitt
returned as prime minister and St. Vincent resigned from the Admiralty. Orde’s
brother Thomas, now Baron Bolton, had served as the chief secretary for Ireland
in the 1780s and worked closely with Pitt on Irish affairs. The new First Lord,
Viscount Melville, was a veteran politician and close associate of Pitt’s. Bolton
had retired, but he still could advocate for his brother’s career with his former colleagues. Despite Orde’s general unpopularity, he did retain some friends among
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naval officers who thought St. Vincent had treated him poorly. Admiral Sir William Cornwallis campaigned heavily on his behalf, keeping Orde informed of his
progress throughout the summer of 1804. As commander in chief of the Channel
Fleet—the navy’s most important active-duty command—Cornwallis was a powerful ally.22 In August of that year, Sir John Colpoys, one of the members of the
Board of Admiralty, hinted that Melville might be able to find Orde a position.23
When the good news of his appointment officially arrived in October, Orde received letters of congratulations from a number of prominent officers, including
Sir James Saumarez and Sir Andrew Snape Hamond, former comptroller of the
Royal Navy.24 Orde now had a chance to rescue not only his career but also his
reputation among his peers.
ORDE IN COMMAND
Melville gave Orde command of a small squadron off Cádiz. In September 1804,
British squadrons were responsible for blockading French squadrons in Toulon,
Ferrol, Rochefort, and Brest, not to mention maintaining superiority in the
Channel and the North Sea to monitor Napoléon’s invasion preparations. Spain
was not a belligerent, but the British admiral blockading the French squadron
holed up in Ferrol was convinced that the Spanish would declare war once they
received a shipment of treasure from South America. The cabinet acted on this
intelligence by ordering four British frigates to seize that treasure in October. In
an attack delivered without warning and without a declaration of war, three Spanish ships were captured and the fourth exploded, killing innocent passengers and
inflaming international opinion against the British.
War with Spain may well have been inevitable, but the capture of the treasure
ships certainly accelerated the timeline and made an already dangerous strategic
situation significantly worse. Spain’s declaration of war doubled the number
of ships of the line facing the British and necessitated additional blockades of
Spanish ports. Nelson, commanding the Mediterranean Fleet, could spare no
additional ships to watch Cartagena or Cádiz, so Orde’s squadron was sent from
Portsmouth to blockade Cádiz.25
A glance at a map will tell readers that Cádiz is on the Atlantic rather than the
Mediterranean coast of Spain, and it is reasonable to wonder why the commander
in chief of the Mediterranean might be held responsible for enemy forces there.
According to the Admiralty, the Mediterranean Sea and the Mediterranean command were two different things. The sea, it was generally agreed, was bounded
in the west by the Strait of Gibraltar; British Mediterranean fleets, however, frequently needed to be stationed west of the strait. Some reasons were geostrategic:
Cádiz was a major Spanish naval base, and the area between the strait and Cape
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Saint Vincent was trafficked heavily by ships transiting between northwestern
Europe and the Mediterranean. Other reasons were practical, as British forces
could not always depend on well-stocked naval bases in the Mediterranean.
Still, stationing the Mediterranean Fleet outside the Mediterranean was less
than ideal. From at least the middle of the seventeenth century, the British had
made concerted efforts to obtain secure naval bases in the sea itself, or at least
in locations more convenient to the sea than Lisbon. Tangier showed initial
promise, even though it is on the Atlantic side of the strait; unfortunately, it
lacked a safe harbor and was difficult to protect from land-based attacks. A bold
assault was launched against Cádiz in 1702, not only because capturing it would
sever the connection between Spain and its Atlantic empire, but also because it
would make a suitable base for Mediterranean operations. The attack failed, but
it demonstrates that Cádiz long had been thought of as being connected to the
Mediterranean. Success finally came with the capture of Gibraltar in 1704, but
little changed immediately; like Tangier, Gibraltar had no anchorage and only
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limited dockyard facilities. The best port in the western Mediterranean—which,
unlike Gibraltar and the Atlantic ports, could be used as a base for blockading
Toulon—was Mahón, on Minorca, six hundred miles inside the strait. Captured
by the British in 1708, it was robust enough to sustain a fleet in the Mediterranean. It did not remain in British hands for the whole century, though, making it
difficult to rely on as a permanent base.
Even when the British did control Minorca, Mediterranean commanders both
took responsibility for and relied on Atlantic ports. When the fleet was tasked
with monitoring Cádiz, it relied on the combination of major allied facilities at
Lisbon, the developing naval base at Gibraltar, and the provisions available for
purchase in Tangier. The 1798 dispute between Orde and St. Vincent had arisen
in precisely these circumstances. Cádiz was, in Admiralty terms, under the authority of the commander in chief of the Mediterranean—in 1804, Nelson.26 But,
as we have seen, Nelson was junior to Orde; Orde’s command, no matter how
small, could not be considered subordinate to Nelson’s.
This complication was entirely unnecessary. Both Nelson and Orde were high
up on the seniority lists as vice admirals, and there were numerous qualified
candidates for the Cádiz command who were junior to Nelson. The Admiralty
had more admirals than it could employ; finding an eager rear admiral would
not have been difficult. Orde’s appointment was not the first time Cádiz had
been separated from the Mediterranean command, but it was the first time that
the admiral off Cádiz had been senior to the commander in chief of the Mediterranean.27 The political decision to appoint Orde—not only senior to Nelson but
with a history of jealous conflict with him—created unnecessary and avoidable
seams in the command structure and complicated information sharing across the
Strait of Gibraltar.
Melville’s decision to give Orde an independent command off Cádiz therefore
broke with long-standing precedent. The particular circumstances of the strategic situation in 1804 make the decision even less explicable. Minorca had been
returned to the Spanish under the terms of the Treaty of Amiens, meaning there
was no base from which to watch Toulon. A promising new base at Malta—captured from the French in 1800—might have counterbalanced Minorca’s loss, but
it was too far from Toulon to be of use to Nelson. For his blockade, he resorted
to a hodgepodge of Sardinian harbors and out-of-the-way anchorages, but none
were capable of supporting his fleet logistically. He had to rely, as many British
admirals had before him, on long communication and supply lines to North Africa and through Gibraltar to the Atlantic coast.28
Orde took responsibility for Cádiz beginning 27 October 1804. The Spanish
had six ships of the line preparing for sea, and there was a French ship of the
line in port as well. Orde’s squadron of five ships of the line was not particularly
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020
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powerful. His flagship, Glory, was an imposing ninety-eight-gun three-decker,
but Defence was an elderly seventy-four and the three others—Ruby, Agamemnon, and Polyphemus—were mere sixty-fours, barely worthy of a position in the
line of battle. Technically, the Spanish were not yet belligerents, but Orde’s orders
were clear: he was to prevent French and Spanish ships from leaving port.29 The
uncertainty in the diplomatic situation may have contributed to Melville’s failure
to communicate his intent to Orde. In a personal note, separate from the official
orders, Melville explained that the Admiralty wanted “to have a small cruising
squadron outside of the Straits of Gibraltar for the protection of our trade and
watching the enemy.”30 It was not immediately apparent at the time that the
difference between the official orders (blockade Cádiz) and the personal note
(protect trade and watch the enemy) would matter. Yet this seemingly innocuous
discrepancy would feature prominently later in the competing stories about what
happened when the French appeared in the strait. Melville’s letter and orders
confused the intended responsibilities of the command.
For his part, Orde did not seek clarification. He finally had returned from the
wilderness of half pay, and he knew that his new command was ripe with opportunities for glory and enrichment. Whether he was supposed to be protecting
British trade or just blockading Cádiz, he was back at sea in an area he knew well.
Melville had succumbed to pressure from Orde’s relatives and friends—especially Cornwallis—in agreeing to appoint him, but he also must have thought
that Orde’s knowledge of the Mediterranean station and Cádiz made him a
strong candidate. He was wrong. Orde needed to be managed as Orde himself
managed—that is, by the book, and with an unnecessary number of instructions.
What was needed off Cádiz was a junior admiral instructed to communicate
with Nelson—precisely the arrangement that had been in place in the recent past.
In 1801, Admiral Lord Keith had taken the bulk of the Mediterranean Fleet to
Egypt, and the Admiralty had sent Vice Admiral Charles Pole to Cádiz. Pole was
not only junior to Keith but explicitly instructed to place himself under Keith’s
command if he had to enter the Mediterranean.31 In 1804, Orde was senior to
Nelson, and he was operating under muddled orders. The Admiralty had set
Orde up for failure.
Some of Orde’s official orders were clear: he was instructed on arrival to
send a frigate to Cartagena to check on Spanish preparations there, but from
that point on he was “not thereafter to employ any of the ships or vessels under
[his] command within the Mediterranean, except to procure supplies of stores
or provisions.” The orders were explicit in limiting his ships to travel “occasionally to Tetuan or Tangier to procure fresh beef.” Orde reinforced these orders in
lengthy regulations issued to his squadron, telling his captains that even Gibraltar
was off-limits. This particular regulation had more to do with the presence of
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol73/iss2/10
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plague in the garrison there in late 1804 than it did with questions about his area
of responsibility, but also it indicated that he was cognizant of the demarcation
between his area and Nelson’s.32
Seams of Command
It is easy in retrospect to see how the seam between Orde’s and Nelson’s commands would create communication problems, but it was readily apparent at the
time as well. Orde attempted to placate Nelson immediately on arrival, writing
to him in November 1804 and offering to “[seize] every occasion of giving Your
Lordship any material information” in the hopes that Nelson would do the same
in return. Orde even went so far as to say that Nelson should “command [him]
without ceremony,” though such an offer probably was never intended seriously.33
At the same time, Orde ordered all Nelson’s ships to withdraw into the strait, away
from the vicinity of Cádiz.34
Nelson was taken aback by the decision to slice Cádiz from his command, but
he does not seem to have held Orde responsible. The personal conflict between
Orde and Nelson should not be exaggerated. Nelson had not sought to offend
Orde when Nelson was appointed to command the squadron off Toulon in
1798, and he does not seem to have held any animosity toward him. Orde was
unquestionably jealous of Nelson, but his anger was directed at St. Vincent and
the Admiralty. Orde eventually served as a last-minute replacement pallbearer at
Nelson’s funeral.35
However, the structure of the two commands made friction between them unavoidable. Nelson spent much of his time as commander in chief in the Mediterranean frustrated by slow and inconsistent instructions from London. He complained to the Admiralty that he had not been informed of Orde’s appointment
until Orde had announced it himself.36 Placing a senior admiral with a detached
squadron squarely on his lines of communication promised to complicate, rather
than simplify, matters. In February 1805, fully three months after Orde’s arrival,
Orde attempted to clarify the boundary between the two commands. He suggested to the Admiralty that a north–south line could be drawn through Cape
Spartel, the southwestern edge of the strait. Orde hoped that drawing the boundary on the Atlantic side of the strait would obviate him from being responsible for
convoys in the strait. He wrote to Nelson, passive-aggressively: “It will therefore
I presume, be incumbent on your Lordship to provide for this important duty.”37
Meanwhile, Nelson struggled to work around Orde. In March, Nelson told the
Admiralty that “a report”—no details were given, but one suspects Orde—had
reached him accusing him of frequently sending his ships out of the Mediterranean. Nelson flatly denied having done so, “except the [frigate] Amazon which
was sent to Lisbon with my dispatches.”38 Nelson was being disingenuous here.

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020

11

152

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 2, Art. 10

To receive any communication from London, he had to send ships to Lisbon occasionally. He had given secret orders to Amazon to sail well out to the west to
avoid Orde’s squadron.39 Orde missed Amazon but intercepted another one of
Nelson’s ships, the sloop Halcyon. Orde added his own dispatches to Nelson’s and
required Halcyon to call at his squadron on its return. It was nearly impossible
for Nelson to bypass Orde without violating the command structure arrangement
or practicing deception.40
Conflict over Prize Money
What really frustrated Nelson about Orde’s appointment was that Orde’s squadron was in perfect position to profit from the declaration of war against Spain.
Prize money was the lifeblood of naval warfare, and most officers thought that
there was no better time to make a fortune than at the beginning of a war, when
the enemy’s merchant ships were likely to be at sea. Admirals claimed an eighth of
the value of every prize captured by ships under their command, but since Orde
did not report to Nelson, Nelson had no claim on prizes captured by Orde’s ships.
Nelson’s friends commiserated with him: “I have never felt more indignant than
as Your Lordship’s account of the Admiralty’s treatment of you,” wrote Alexander
Ball.41 Another correspondent expressed similar sentiments, damning Melville
(“the Scotch Lord”) and writing, “I am very sorry to hear . . . that Sir John Orde is
come to skim the cream of the first of the Spanish War off Cadiz.”42
The cream was very rich, in the end. By mid-December, Orde was already requesting Admiralty instructions about what to do with all the money he had on
board the ships in his squadron. The frigate Lively captured a single ship worth
£180,000, only to be topped by Polyphemus capturing a Spanish frigate carrying
1,215,000 Spanish dollars plus bark and cocoa. Collectively, the squadron captured somewhere between 2.5 and 4 million Spanish dollars, which Orde eventually sent back to England in Lively.43 If the command off Cádiz had remained a
part of Nelson’s Mediterranean Fleet, then a share of the bounty would have been
Nelson’s; instead, it was Orde’s. If Orde congratulated himself on having balanced
his karmic ledger with Nelson, the evidence has not survived. We can be certain
that he was immensely pleased with the haul, even if there were significant legal
battles still to be fought about whether the Spanish ships had been captured before the official declaration of war.44
Orde’s enthusiasm for prizes soon got the better of him, however. The routine
he established while blockading Cádiz was more relaxed than that of his archenemy, St. Vincent. In 1798, in the wake of the great mutinies at Spithead and the
Nore, St. Vincent had enforced a close blockade to keep his squadron occupied
and disciplined. The ships were so close to Cádiz that officers had their laundry
done in town and individuals in the city could be discerned easily from the
decks.45 Orde took a more reasonable approach, generally staying ten to fifteen
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miles offshore.46 Such a distance provided flexibility, as he was close enough to
monitor enemy preparations from his flagship. Orde deployed most of his frigates and sloops elsewhere, and did so aggressively. Lively, Amphion, and Wasp
received regular two-week cruises intended to capture prizes, while Polyphemus’s
capture of the valuable Spanish frigate suggests that Orde was even willing to detach ships of the line from his squadron. The more ships cruising, the more likely
he would be to get an eighth of the value of a prize.47
The Admiralty was not impressed. On 11 January 1805, their lordships reminded Orde of his duty. In a public letter, they accused him of being jealous of
Nelson’s allocation of frigates because they increased his chances at prize money.
This was unacceptable: “Their Lordships are unwilling to believe that any officer
in His Majesty’s Service would consider prize money as an object to which any
part of the force under his command be primarily appropriated.” They expressed
their “dissatisfaction” that Orde had wasted their time with “correspondence in
which competition for prize money seems to be the chief if not the only subject of
discussion.”48 This was strong language indeed. To reprimand a serving admiral
for greed in an official letter was both shocking and exceedingly rare.
Orde clearly was stung. From his perspective, he had behaved exactly as anyone in his situation would have. And furthermore he had not failed in his core
mission: the Spanish were still in Cádiz, after all. The prize money dispute was
ancillary to that (although he was very disappointed when subsequent rumors
reached him that Nelson had been given a prize agent in Gibraltar with permission to lay claim to the prizes captured by Orde’s frigates).
But in any case, the real issue was that his orders had been written poorly.
While the personal note from Melville had told him that his squadron was intended to protect British trade from Cape Saint Vincent to Gibraltar, his official
orders said nothing about that; his mission was to blockade Cádiz. His squadron
was big enough to do one mission or the other, but not both.49
It is easy to imagine Orde keeping himself awake in the middle of the night by
composing bitter, biting replies to the Admiralty. Nevertheless, the fact remained
that he once again had managed to annoy his superiors. This time, presumably,
he did not contemplate challenging one of them to a duel. Instead, in a letter
written in his own hand and dated 27 March 1805, he resigned.50 The same day,
Villeneuve sailed from Toulon.
THE FRENCH ARE OUT
Nelson anticipated that, when Villeneuve sortied, he would head east toward
Egypt. Setting up a long-range blockade, Nelson kept his frigates off Toulon to
keep an eye on French movements and deployed his fleet in the close waters
among Sicily, Sardinia, and Tunisia. If the French went east, they would have to
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pass through these waters, and Nelson hoped to bring them to battle. From 27 to
30 March, Nelson was south of Sardinia.
Villeneuve left Toulon and initially made his way south to avoid the British,
who he thought were off Barcelona.51 On 31 March, the French fleet was observed
at sea by two frigates under Nelson’s command. Active remained to shadow
Villeneuve, while Phoebe sailed south in search of Nelson. Active, however, lost
contact with the French that night, and so also went in search of Nelson in the
morning.52 For Villeneuve the timing was perfect. On 1 April, he learned from a
Sicilian merchantman that Nelson was not waiting off Barcelona, and he decided
to turn west.
News that the French fleet was out reached Nelson on 3 April, first from Phoebe and a few hours later from Active, but the frigates told him the French were
sailing south-southwest, indicating a likely destination to the east.53 Nelson spent
the next two weeks sailing between the south coast of Sardinia and the northwest
coast of Sicily, waiting to pounce on the French fleet. He spread his frigates across
the area, hoping to renew contact with Villeneuve.54
Meanwhile, on 7 April, Villeneuve stopped briefly at Cartagena to collect
the six Spanish ships of the line anchored there. However, on learning that they
would not be able to sail for thirty-six to forty-eight hours, and probably expecting the British to be close behind him, he raised anchor late on the night of 7 April
and set a course for the Strait of Gibraltar.55
At Gibraltar, the early morning of 9 April did not appear to be much different
from any other. Fisgard, a frigate from Nelson’s fleet, was anchored behind the
protective mole where it had been for almost four weeks making major repairs.
Fisgard’s captain, Lord Mark Kerr, busied his crew loading provisions.56 Twentyfour hours earlier, a convoy of forty-six merchant ships had left Gibraltar for England, escorted by one of Orde’s frigates, Mercury, and a sloop. A seventy-four-gun
ship of the line from Nelson’s fleet, Renown, commanded by Sir Richard Strachan,
also was refitting at Gibraltar. Strachan sailed with the convoy to provide extra
protection through the Strait of Gibraltar, known as the Gut.57 Spanish gunboats
and privateers often took advantage of the fourteen-mile-wide choke point, picking off merchantmen that strayed too far from Royal Navy protection. Strachan
parted with the westbound convoy just off Cape Trafalgar at noon on 8 April,
and by first light on 9 April he had positioned Renown at the southwestern end of
the Gut, about five or six miles northeast of Cape Spartel, preparing to fight the
fresh easterly headwind and beat his way back to Gibraltar. Strachan could see the
Rock rising slowly above the horizon in the early morning light, as Renown made
headway back through the Gut.
The calmness of the morning was shattered when sails began to appear over
the eastern horizon. By 10 AM, it was clear that these sails belonged to a large fleet.
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Kerr signaled Strachan about the strange fleet, then hastily set about making his
ship ready for sea.58 Strachan also had spotted the ships and was using the fresh
easterly wind to make all possible speed to the northwest to warn Orde’s squadron off Cádiz, collecting the sloop Sophie en route. By 11 AM, Kerr, still making
ready for sea at Gibraltar, counted eleven French ships of the line, five or six
frigates, and two brigs passing through the Gut—no doubt an impressive sight.
Kerr quickly issued orders to send a recently captured brig east with dispatches
to warn Nelson.59 By 2 PM, Fisgard’s crew had completed the herculean effort
of readying their ship for sea. Kerr gave orders to haul Fisgard out of the mole
at Gibraltar, making all sail westward to take advantage of the easterly wind to
pass well south of the last known French position. Kerr raced back to England to
notify the Admiralty that the French were out, but all he knew was that they had
passed through the strait—nothing more.60
At 2 PM, Orde and his flag captain both observed a strange ship of the line
approaching, firing guns, but it was 2:20 PM before they could make out the signal for “enemy approaching,” and 2:45 PM before they could identify the ship as
Renown. Orde’s squadron was in a precarious position at anchor nine miles off
Cádiz. Included in the convoy that had sailed through the Strait of Gibraltar on
the previous day were six transport ships filled with supplies, and Orde’s ships
were badly in need of water and provisions. The transports were currently alongside, and the ships’ yards were employed hoisting provisions on board. When
Renown made contact, decks were littered with supplies waiting to be lowered
into the hold, and the squadron was not in a position to set sail quickly, much less
clear the decks and prepare for action.61
At that time, Orde could not have known Villeneuve’s mission. There was
a very real possibility that it was to catch and overpower Orde’s squadron off
Cádiz, and since the wind was coming from the east, Villeneuve had the weather
gauge. Accordingly, Orde’s squadron began casting off the transports, throwing
overboard the casks and staves that had yet to be stored in the hold, and clearing
for action. Orde busied himself sending dozens of signals, annoying his captains.
Even working at a frantic pace, it was 4 PM before the ships of the squadron were
ready to weigh anchor, which they did in company with the transports, and made
sail to the west, joined by Renown and Sophie. At this point, Villeneuve’s squadron was within sight of Orde’s flagship and was observed to be sailing along the
coast toward Cádiz. By 7 PM, Orde’s squadron had lost sight of the French fleet
in the fading light. The immediate threat of action with a superior enemy force
to windward had passed.62
After recognizing that his squadron was outnumbered, Orde quickly decided
to sail west and retreat to the Channel. Whatever plans the Combined Fleet might
have, Orde could not force it into Cádiz, fight it on equal terms, or (as he later
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claimed) shadow it without risking disastrous battle. It was also at this time—on
the evening of 9 April—that Orde first had an opportunity to relay information
of the French presence to the surrounding British forces and the Admiralty. Orde
had no way of knowing that Kerr had sent a ship in search of Nelson, nor that
he had sailed to England. Regardless, Kerr’s intelligence did not include what
the French had done once they passed through the strait. At that moment, Orde
knew more about the French disposition and intentions than any other officer
in the Royal Navy. It was essential to share that information with the Admiralty
and the commanding officers of other British fleets. Only hours after getting his
squadron safely under way, Orde gave dispatches to Commander Philip Rosenhagen aboard Sophie and ordered him to “inform [the Channel Fleet] of the Convoy sailing and of the French Fleet having passed the Gutt, also the Spaniards having 9 or 10 sail of the line ready for Sea.”63 Orde also stated that he did not know
the Combined Fleet’s intentions, but he was “of opinion it must be westward.”64
Orde correctly gauged that his first action should be to inform the Admiralty.
However, once Sophie had departed, Orde also had responsibility to spread this
information across the seams of the surrounding commands. One problem he
immediately faced was that the wind changed. The easterly wind, which had
been favorable to his quick departure from the waters off Cádiz and the French
fleet’s push through the strait, shifted over the course of 10 April to a strong wind
blowing from the west-southwest. Orde’s squadron therefore made little progress
toward the west over the next two days, not arriving off Cape Saint Vincent until
late on 12 April, when the wind shifted again and blew strongly from the northnorthwest. This prevented the squadron from making any northern progress
until the 19th.65
During his slow passage, Orde had plenty of opportunities to think carefully
about how to arrange his forces and communicate his intelligence. On 11 April,
he ordered the frigate Amphion and two sloops, Wasp and Beagle, to cruise off
Cape Saint Vincent until they received further orders. Captain Sutton of Amphion
was directed to inform any British ships passing of the presence of the French
fleet and to order warships to return to the Channel or, if the French returned
through the strait, to head to the Mediterranean. Along with these orders were
dispatches that Sutton was to have delivered to Lisbon.66 On 12 April, Orde
dispatched the frigate Mercury to Barbados and Jamaica, warning that the Combined Fleet was at large and possibly sailing for the West Indies.67 Orde ordered
Mercury to call at Madeira en route, “without anchoring,” and forward a letter to
the East Indies with similar information.68
At no point after making contact with the French fleet did Orde attempt to
send any information east to Nelson; instead, he left a letter for Nelson at Lisbon, where the chances of Nelson receiving it were low. The Mediterranean is,
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admittedly, large, and Nelson’s fleet could have been anywhere from Egypt to
Spain; furthermore, the areas of responsibility as laid out by the Admiralty clearly
separated Orde from the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, given that his ships were
allowed to resupply at Gibraltar, it would have been reasonable to leave a letter
for Nelson there.
Strachan clearly thought that was the correct course of action. In the week
after joining Orde’s squadron, he sent him five letters, first suggesting, and then
pleading, that contact needed to be made with Nelson. On 9 April, Strachan told
Orde that he thought Fisgard was still fitting out at Gibraltar and unlikely to sail
until the next day, with unknown intentions, but possibly east to find Nelson.
He also stressed that he did not know where Nelson was, and feared he had gone
east to Egypt. The following day, seemingly aware that Orde had no intentions of
going east or sending news east, Strachan claimed that he may have misspoken
about Nelson’s location. Nelson was probably somewhere between Sardinia and
Malta, and would not sail toward Egypt if the French were out with an easterly
wind. He also said that he thought it likely that Nelson was in pursuit of the
French, possibly a couple of days behind. In his third letter, Strachan reinforced
this guess, and also stressed that Renown was critically low on water—a clear
hint that he thought Orde should let him return to Gibraltar. In his fourth and
fifth letters, written as Orde’s squadron struggled to make northern progress, he
doubled down on the poor condition of Renown, which he said was leaking more
every day, and with masts and rigging in such poor condition that he feared they
would be carried away in a strong wind. From his tone, it is clear that Strachan
did not wish to leave the vicinity of the strait or to be detached from Nelson’s
fleet. He grew increasingly desperate to return to Gibraltar, although once the
squadron began making progress north he resigned himself to his fate.69
In a personal letter to Nelson written two weeks later, Strachan expressed his
frustration with Orde’s decision-making. Strachan said he had planned to return
to Gibraltar once he had warned Orde of the French fleet, but Orde forced him
to join his squadron. Moreover, Orde had taken “Renown from her station at a
time he had determined to leave Cadiz without entertaining whether the enemy
proceeded from Cadiz to the westward, or returned up the Mediterranean, or
whether your Lordship followed them.”70 Strachan and Orde had a fraught relationship even before the incident off Cádiz. In December, Orde had accused
Strachan of lingering in the strait in pursuit of a prize, disobeying direct orders
from Orde to return to the Mediterranean—here again, the seams of the area
of responsibility created unnecessary conflicts. Orde had taken his complaint
all the way to the Admiralty, which responded (the day after rebuking him for
pursuing prizes) that it hoped “from the character which Sir Richard holds in the
Service, that he will be able to assign such reasons as will remove any unfavorable
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2020

17

158

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 73 [2020], No. 2, Art. 10

impression which may have been formed.”71 The Admiralty agreed to investigate
the complaint, but said in so many words that they highly doubted Strachan had
misbehaved. Orde’s greed and grating personality compounded the confusion of
communicating among commands.
Meanwhile, on 16 April, as Orde fought adverse winds off Cape Saint Vincent,
Nelson first learned the French fleet had been seen off Cartagena. Two days later,
stationed off Sardinia, he learned that the French had passed the strait—but not
from Orde or Kerr. Instead, Amazon arrived with intelligence from a Ragusan brig,
which had seen the French in transit. Nelson had a hard time believing it was not
a feint, convinced as he was that the Toulon Fleet was destined for Egypt. He detached his frigates and smaller vessels to cover the Barbary Coast in case the French
sent a secondary expedition east.72 On 19 April, he reluctantly decided to sail west,
into the teeth of the wind. It was a long and slow fifteen-day passage to Gibraltar.73
Back in London, the Admiralty was in crisis. On 8 April, Melville had been
forced to resign following a financial mismanagement scandal dating from his
time as treasurer of the Royal Navy. His replacement, Admiral Charles Middleton, now ennobled as Baron Barham, did not assume office until 29 April. It was
not a moment too soon: on his first day news arrived from Fisgard of the French
escape from Toulon and passage through the Strait of Gibraltar. Pitt came to
Barham’s office at 2 AM on the 30th to find him hard at work at his desk. They
ordered Collingwood to take fourteen ships of the line from the Channel Fleet
and sail to Cádiz.74
On 4 May, Nelson finally reached Tétouan bay, at the eastern approaches to
the strait, and took on water and provisions.75 He was surprised to have no new
news of the French. In a letter to the Admiralty, he expressed his frustration with
the situation: “I believe my ill luck is to go on for a longer time, and I now much
fear that Sir John Orde has not sent his small ships to watch the Enemy’s fleet,
and ordered them to return to the Straits’ mouth, to give me information, that
I might know how to direct my proceedings.” The key question for Nelson was
whether to try to guess Villeneuve’s destination. The West Indies seemed likely,
but, as Nelson put it, he could not sail the Mediterranean Fleet to the West Indies
“without something beyond mere surmise.” In any case, the Combined Fleet had
a month’s head start.76 Clearly, Nelson expected up-to-date information, primarily from Orde, when he arrived at the strait. The news that he received—that
the French had passed Gibraltar and had not returned—was almost four weeks
old. Ideally, what he needed was word from ships that had shadowed the French
and determined their destination. Orde had not dispatched any of his frigates or
cruisers in this capacity. Like Nelson, Orde thought the West Indies were a likely
destination, and had told the Admiralty and the commanders in the West Indies
were a likely destination, and had told the Admiralty and the commanders in
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the West Indies as much. But he had not told Nelson, the admiral most directly
concerned with the Toulon Fleet.77
Without fresh information, Nelson passed through the Strait of Gibraltar on
6 May and arrived at Lagos Bay two days later, where Orde’s supply ships were
anchored.78 Amphion, Wasp, and Beagle were nearby off Cape Saint Vincent, but
they had no new information. The only intelligence Nelson gathered was that
the French had not sailed north and had not been seen in over three weeks.79
That increased the chances that the French had gone west, but it was only after
he met Rear Admiral George Campbell, a Scot in Portuguese service, that he had
any positive intelligence to support that guess.80 On 11 May, a week after he had
arrived in the strait, he finally made the decision to commit to the West Indies—
thirty-two days behind Villeneuve.81 Orde’s failure to leave any information for
Nelson cost valuable time and confused the intelligence situation.
Nelson arrived at Barbados on the evening of 4 June, after a twenty-six-day
passage. This was fast by fleet standards, and certainly better than the thirtyfive-day passage Villeneuve had made a few weeks earlier.82 Nelson immediately
met with Lieutenant General Sir William Myers, the commanding officer in
Barbados and the Leeward Islands, and Rear Admiral Alexander Cochrane, who
had arrived two months earlier in pursuit of a French squadron out of Rochefort.
Myers had received a letter the day before from the commanding officer at Saint
Lucia reporting that the Combined Fleet had been spotted sailing south toward
Barbados or Trinidad. It obviously was not Barbados, so Myers offered Nelson
two thousand troops from Barbados to help defend, or possibly retake, Trinidad.
Nelson harbored doubts about the intelligence, but the added need to take additional troops to Trinidad convinced him to go south.
The following morning at 9:30 AM, Nelson’s fleet was making sail to the south.
As Nelson approached Tobago, he received news from a brig sent ahead that an
American merchantman had reported being boarded by the French off the island
of Saint Vincent, and that they were sailing south. On the morning of 7 June, Nelson’s fleet prepared for battle, expecting the Combined Fleet to be in the channel
between Trinidad and mainland South America. However, on arriving, Nelson
found only empty sea. The lookouts who had spotted the French from Saint Lucia
had mistaken three French frigates for the Combined Fleet, and the information
the American merchant had provided was deliberately false. As Nelson pondered
his next move, news arrived that the Combined Fleet had taken Diamond Rock, a
small, fortified British outpost situated on a tiny rocky island (and commissioned
as a sloop) about a mile and a half off the southwestern coast of Martinique.83
Villeneuve had been at Martinique all along—only 140 miles away from Nelson when he arrived in Barbados. Only a couple of hours before Nelson sailed
south toward Trinidad, Villeneuve had sailed north to Guadeloupe, where he
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embarked troops, and then continued north past Antigua. On 8 June, he captured
fifteen of the sixteen merchant ships in a homeward-bound British convoy, worth
five million francs. After interrogating the prisoners, Villeneuve learned of Nelson’s presence in the West Indies and decided to return across the Atlantic. On
11 June, the Combined Fleet set sail for Ferrol.84
On 8 June, Nelson frantically sailed north from Trinidad, frustrated that he
had turned the wrong way. At Dominica, he learned that the Combined Fleet
was heading north, and at Antigua on 12 June he learned that it was returning
to Europe, although among his captains opinion on its destination was divided.
Nelson thought Cádiz or Toulon was the likely destination, in part because he
still thought that the true target was Egypt.85 He set a more southerly course for
the Strait of Gibraltar—only two days behind his adversary. A few days later, he
sent a frigate and a sloop ahead to Ferrol to warn the British squadron there in
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case Villeneuve appeared. Both fleets crossed the Atlantic, initially only a couple
of hundred miles apart but sailing courses for different destinations. Nelson arrived at Gibraltar on 19 July, where he was disappointed at receiving no news of
the French.86
Villeneuve’s luck ran out when he arrived back in European waters. Curieux, the
brig Nelson had sent ahead, had spotted the Combined Fleet at sea on the passage
and realized that its course would take it north of the Azores, toward Ferrol. This
news reached the Admiralty in the early hours of 9 July, and Barham dispatched immediate orders for the Rochefort squadron of five ships of the line to combine with
the ten ships of the line off Cape Finisterre under the command of Vice Admiral
Sir Robert Calder. Calder’s fifteen ships of the line intercepted the Combined Fleet
of twenty ships of the line on 22 July in light winds with a heavy swell and patchy
fog. After an indecisive battle that evening, both fleets spent several days maneuvering for position before Villeneuve, demoralized, sailed southeast for the port of
Vigo. Although Calder was later court-martialed for not bringing the Combined
Fleet to battle on the 23rd or 24th, his actions proved to be the strategic victory that
thwarted Napoléon’s plans for combining the naval power of France and Spain in
the Channel to cover an invasion of England.87
It is impossible to say whether Nelson would have caught Villeneuve in the
West Indies had he received proper intelligence from Orde. However, we can say
that the near miss was a matter of hours. Had Nelson departed European waters a
few days earlier, it is unlikely that he would have sailed to Trinidad after arriving
at Barbados. The bad intelligence that caused him to do so was received in Barbados only a few hours before his fleet arrived on 4 June. Rather, Nelson would
have considered Martinique, France’s stronghold in the Windward Islands, a logical point to have begun his search. Nelson also might have been able to prevent
the French capture of the West India convoy. While this is all speculation, we
can say that the margins in the Trafalgar campaign were small—matters of hours
and days. Orde leaving Nelson in the dark was significant, even if the alternative
outcomes are impossible to know.
ORDE’S DEFENSE
Nelson’s near miss in the West Indies, combined with Calder’s action, resulted in
the Combined Fleet being shut up, ironically, back in Cádiz, now watched by the
entire Mediterranean Fleet under Collingwood. Orde had returned to England,
but his passage had been slow and ridden with angst. After arriving at Spithead
on 11 May, he was sent into quarantine, stemming from his squadron’s proximity
to the plague-ridden Gibraltar garrison.88 While awaiting release, he received letters (one of which was quoted earlier in this article) that questioned his actions
and attacked his character.
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Accused of cowardice, and of failing to do as Nelson would have done, Orde
proceeded as soon as he could to the Admiralty for an interview with Barham.
Orde asked whether the Admiralty approved of his bringing his fleet back to the
Channel; Barham said yes, and then asked whether Orde was interested in being
employed again. Orde, who clearly had expected to have to defend his actions
and was eager to do so, was taken aback. He said he would consider employment
again, but could he please explain his actions anyway? Barham pointed to a stack
of unopened letters on his desk; Orde got the hint and left.89 Orde never was employed again. Barham likely asked the question as a courtesy and to avoid being
accused of treating Orde unfairly. He probably did legitimately approve of Orde’s
decision to bring his squadron back, but Orde’s behavior in the months—and
years—prior had disqualified him from future consideration.
Even as early as his retreat from Cádiz, Orde seems to have become increasingly uncomfortable with his own actions. While on the passage from Cádiz to
Spithead he had written nearly daily to the Admiralty, and each letter contained
a new justification. In early January 1806, Orde participated in Nelson’s funeral,
but he was still frustrated by how his active career had ended. Sometime after
the funeral, he wrote a four-thousand-word defense of his actions, followed by a
second, six-thousand-word additional defense. Neither is dated, and he claimed
later that the documents were written confidentially for his friends. Their tone
is that of a proud, wounded animal. When combined with the letters he wrote
in April 1805, they create a comprehensive but internally incoherent picture of
Orde’s thinking.90
His best defense, as laid out primarily in the letters written on his way back
to the Channel, comes in his reasonable assessment of the likely plans of the
French and Spanish. In January 1805, he noted, the Toulon Fleet had sortied and
attempted to link up with the Rochefort squadron before being forced back by
poor weather. Orde suggested that the French would not squander the chance
presented by freedom of movement in the Atlantic. It seemed reasonably unlikely
that they would return to the Mediterranean if they had the chance to leave.91
This is the analysis that Corbett rightly praises as insightful, and Orde deserves
credit for having guessed the outline of Napoléon’s invasion plans—even if Orde’s
guesses conveniently justified his decision to desert Cádiz.
Less persuasively, Orde claimed he could not have given the Admiralty or
Nelson any more information about the destination of the Combined Fleet because he could not track it at sea. He gave many reasons why this was impossible,
each of varying degrees of legitimacy. Initially, he claimed that his squadron was
too weak to shadow the Combined Fleet. Glory, Agamemnon, and Renown were
poor sailors, and Orde correctly pointed out that if he had tried to stay in contact with the Combined Fleet he might have been forced into a disadvantageous
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battle. At the very least, deploying his full squadron in such a way would have cost
the Admiralty the use of his ships of the line for an extended period. Tracking an
enemy fleet with an unknown destination was indeed challenging, and in his later
defense Orde pointed to Nelson’s own difficulties in having his frigates track the
Toulon Fleet in the last days of March.
Orde also argued, strangely, that it was impossible to know an enemy’s destination. He noted that the expedition led by General Lazare Hoche had left Brest in
1796 and “proceeded for the sake of deception so far to the westward as to strike
soundings in the Banks of Newfoundland, before they steered for Ireland.”92 Not
only did targeting the West Indies fit the pattern of Napoléon’s deployments that
Orde had identified, but there were well-known routes from Cádiz to the West
Indies, and it beggars belief that a frigate trailing Villeneuve’s ships could not have
made an educated guess about their destination after a few days at sea. Curieux
did precisely this when encountering Villeneuve in the middle of the Atlantic in
June on the return leg.93
Another strand of Orde’s defense is that Nelson would have been, or perhaps
should have been, in a better position to act than Orde. Guessing that Villeneuve
had gone west conveniently made Orde’s decision to go north the correct one.
Had Villeneuve gone east, he wrote, “I should not have hesitated one moment to
risk passing the Strait.” How he would have known that Villeneuve had done so
is not clear, since he had sailed well to the west by the time Villeneuve departed
Cádiz. He did not let such practicalities impede spinning out hypotheticals. He
worried in the same letter that entering the Mediterranean would have been met
with disapproval—recall that his orders strictly prohibited him from doing so.
In that scenario, as the senior officer, he would have had to assume command
of the Mediterranean station. He was quick to say that he had no desire to be in
high command.94 It was Nelson’s burden to bear, and Orde was happy to let him
carry it. While on the passage back from Cádiz, he expressed confidence that, if
the French had gone east, “Nelson will be found in condition, with his 12 ships
of the line and numerous frigates, to act on the defensive without loss, and even
to hang heavily on the skirts of the enemy’s fleet.”95 Orde wanted it both ways—to
claim to have been willing to enter the Mediterranean in pursuit of Villeneuve,
but without having to determine Villeneuve’s course. He went on to argue that
the Toulon Fleet was Nelson’s responsibility, not his, so he need not have tracked
it when it appeared off Cádiz.96 Nelson’s fleet was stronger than Orde’s, and the
Toulon Fleet had been Nelson’s responsibility originally, but the stakes were too
high to abdicate responsibility in this way, on a technicality.
Orde defended his failure to communicate with Nelson on the grounds that he
could not have known where Nelson was, nor predict where Nelson might go. Yet
he simultaneously claimed that he and Strachan worked out where Nelson was
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likely to be, and where he was likely to go: “Lord Nelson on being informed of
[the Toulon Fleet’s] escape from Port, even were it reported as steering westward,
would proceed with his Squadron to the Coast of Egypt, or at least to some position whence he might interrupt an attack on that Country, the Morea at Naples.”97
Why not give that educated guess to an intrepid frigate captain, or at least to a
ship at Gibraltar, with instructions to attempt to find Nelson? Strachan clearly
thought this was the correct course of action. The Admiralty’s poor command
design is partly to blame, but Orde’s lack of imagination and confidence contributed significantly. Orde also knew that Nelson was likely to come west as quickly
as possible once news of the French transit of the strait reached him, but Orde
downplayed the significance of this move by claiming that Nelson might be stuck
in the Mediterranean for “five or six weeks, nay more,” while waiting for a favorable wind.98 In other words, Nelson was too far away and too unlikely to influence
events in the Atlantic to be worth any effort to contact him—yet Orde thought
it was worthwhile to send news to the East Indies Station, six months’ sail away.
On 1 May, Orde expressed surprise that his letters with news of Villeneuve’s
escape were “unaccountably . . . preceded by account from Lord Mark Kerr who I
trusted had gone in quest of Lord Nelson.”99 It was unaccountable because of the
seam along the areas of responsibility at Gibraltar. Orde later claimed that both
he and Kerr had intelligence that the Spanish ships were not prepared for a long
voyage. Furthermore, “so confident were they at Gibraltar that the Toulon Fleet
when seen passing the Straits were bound to Ireland” that Kerr sailed directly
for Ireland, “instead of apprising Lord Nelson or Sir John Orde, as it would have
been his duty in case of uncertainty.”100 We know that Kerr did attempt to apprise
Nelson, and we also know that Kerr did not sail directly for Ireland. Instead, he
landed at Portsmouth, and it was his news that first informed the Admiralty of
the French passage of the strait.101 Orde knew more than Kerr—he knew that the
French had combined with the Spanish in Cádiz, and he guessed that they were
headed west. Orde’s strategic insight and educated guesses justified his own actions, but in failing to share those insights with Nelson he wasted much of their
potency.
Among the more curious decisions that Orde made was to station Amphion,
Wasp, and Beagle together off Cape Saint Vincent, rather than scattering them.
One of the three should have gone to Gibraltar with the latest intelligence and to
await Nelson. It did not require more than one cruiser to warn British shipping
in the area about the presence of the French fleet. In his defense, Orde claimed
that he left them “on [his] Station” with orders “to ascertain and counteract . . .
the movements of the enemy.”102 They did no such thing, in the end, except for
one nearly disastrous investigation of Cádiz’s harbor. A lieutenant from Wasp
took a Portuguese fishing boat to Cádiz and reported that the entire Combined
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Fleet was still there on 22 April—almost two weeks after it had left for the West
Indies.103 Rather than relay this intelligence to Gibraltar, the senior captain sent
it to Lisbon, where the British consul forwarded it on to the foreign secretary.104
If a frigate or sloop had been stationed off Cádiz, such a mistake would not have
been made; Orde’s claim that the frigates were “on [his] Station” may be technically true—his station included Cape Saint Vincent—but they were not optimally
placed for intelligence-gathering purposes, nor were they given instructions
about communicating with Nelson. Why this curious deployment? The archival
record provides hints, but nothing definitive. By stationing three small ships on
the western fringe of his station, Orde could claim that he had not abandoned it
entirely; perhaps he thought they might capture prizes. We cannot know for sure,
but Orde’s orders to his cruisers stand alongside his botched communication with
Nelson as significant failures.
Orde also claimed that standing and fighting Villeneuve, or even hanging on
his skirts as he thought Nelson might do, “would have led to the gratification of
every wish of my heart, to superior command, to increased patronage and emolument, and possibly to great distinction.” Orde wanted credit for, in his words, “the
sacrifice I have made” in forgoing the chance of bringing about a fleet action.105
Even before he reached Spithead, he realized that running from the Combined
Fleet exposed him to accusations of cowardice. This article’s analysis does not
seek to accuse Orde of cowardice—he faced odds of three to one—but his pleading is an indication of the pressure he and other British naval officers were under
to fight no matter the odds.
Orde’s defense collapses amid internal inconsistences and obscures his true motives. He was fed up with his station off Cádiz, from which he had just requested
to be allowed to resign. The rebuke by the Admiralty in January, coupled with
the ongoing friction between his command and Nelson’s, had shattered his morale. Personal disputes with respected officers such as Strachan undermined his
authority. He had made money from prizes, but those winnings were now under
threat from the appointment of Nelson’s prize agent in Gibraltar and the legal
battles over the legitimacy of Spanish prizes taken before the declaration of war.
He thought his responsibilities were to blockade the Spanish (and capture prizes);
the Admiralty thought he was there to blockade the Spanish (and protect British
trade). When the French appeared, he was caught in a precarious situation with
transports alongside and decks covered in stores. Outnumbered three to one, he
sensibly retreated, but in doing so he neglected his most important duty: to put
aside personal history and communicate across the boundaries of his area of responsibility. Orde’s failure cost Nelson a good chance of bringing the Combined
Fleet to action in the West Indies.
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What-if history has limited value; of more importance, both for our understanding of the Trafalgar campaign and for navies today, are the preventable
mistakes that both the Admiralty and Orde made. Some of the contributing
factors are beyond the scope of this article: St. Vincent’s disastrously timed dockyard reforms had destroyed the fleet’s readiness during the recent peace, and the
decision to strike the Spanish preemptively was morally dubious and strategically
disastrous.106 But once a squadron was needed off Cádiz, there was no reason to
appoint Orde to that post. He was senior to Nelson, with a history of conflict
between them well-known to the public and certainly to Melville. Compounding
this mistake were Orde’s strict instructions not to encroach on Nelson’s territory,
even though Gibraltar is one of the world’s great choke points—all information in
and out of the Mediterranean must past through it. Drawing a line across it was
only likely to result in confusion and delay. Today, the United States organizes
its combatant commands geographically. If it continues to operate this way, it is
important to understand how geopolitics can warp traditional boundaries. For
the British in the age of sail, bases in the Mediterranean itself were unreliable,
poorly located, or underequipped; adverse winds easily could make the Strait of
Gibraltar impassable; and the Spanish had major bases on both sides of the strait.
Cádiz therefore should not have been separated from the Mediterranean command by placing it under a senior admiral.
The Admiralty bears responsibility for this mistake, although that is not sufficient to explain what happened off Cádiz. It is easy to play armchair admiral
about Orde’s actions in the face of an overwhelming enemy force. Orde handled
the surprise on the afternoon of 9 April well, all things considered. He protected
his transports, organized his forces, and prepared for action. Corbett’s assessment of Orde’s subsequent retreat is sound. Orde helped concentrate British
naval forces (which otherwise were spread dangerously thinly) on the Channel,
lessening the chances of Napoléon’s fleets gaining control of the invasion route.
Orde did not know much about Calder’s squadron off Finisterre, so subsequent
accusations that he should have joined Calder do not stand up to scrutiny.107
Indeed, it raises further questions about the Admiralty’s ability to coordinate its
various commands.
Orde also communicated efficiently to the West Indies and the Admiralty.
His failure was to the east, to Nelson. The actions of the officers on the spot support this judgment: Kerr tried to communicate with Nelson; Strachan tried to
convince Orde to communicate with Nelson; and Nelson complained that Orde
had not communicated with him. The Lords of the Admiralty had demarcated
the command areas poorly and had given conflicting orders to their chosen commander. Even if they did not grasp fully the problem presented by stationing a
senior admiral off Cádiz, they trusted that such an experienced officer, familiar
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with the responsibilities of the station and the intent of the Admiralty, would set
aside personal jealousies and the annoyances of minor differences in seniority
in the face of a crisis. Their trust was misplaced, demonstrating the importance
of the human element in what we now refer to as mission command. It would be
unfair to say that any other admiral would have behaved differently, but it does
seem as if Orde was uniquely unsuited for his command. Tempted by rich prizes,
he neglected the protection of trade; jealous of Nelson, he treated the seams of
his command too literally; sensitive to questions of character, he reacted badly
when reprimanded. Only by understanding the interaction between the human
failings of commanders and the challenges presented by command boundaries
can senior leaders deploy naval forces effectively. The incident off Cádiz is an
example of poor mission command: the Admiralty chose the wrong man for an
ill-defined mission.
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